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WHITHER COMMUNIST-LED SOCIETY?
AN APPROACH THROUGH PROPERTY LAW
JOHN N. HAZARDt
Professor Jerome Hall has challenged scholars to examine social
structures by comparing laws.' In his view abstraction based on a few
legal systems can provide the starting point for a fuller understanding
of the interrelationship of values, facts and legal relationships in modem
industrial societies. It can also lead to a positing of the direction in
which society is moving.
This challenge provides the motive for this paper, which is designed
to suggest the direction in which communist-led societies are moving
in their effort to meet the problems posed by the industrial revolution.
The materials are values, facts and legal relationships associated with
the concept of property. This is particularly appropriate in a communist-
led society for reasons that you will immediately suppose.
Two factors give validity to such an approach to communist-led
societies: the conscious effort of communists to manipulate social struc-
ture through law, and their focusing of attention on property within
their legal system. No doubt exists in the minds of scholars in societies
currently led by communists that law is an instrument of what the late
Dean Roscoe Pound would call "social engineering." The principal Soviet
commentator on the emerging law of the communist-led states bordering
upon the U.S.S.R. has put his creed in these words: "The new constitu-
tions reflect not alone what has been achieved . . . but they provide
the legislative foundation for the movement forward. . . . They define
the new purpose . . . and create the necessary forerunners and conditions
for its achievement. In that is reflected the new quality of socialist law,
which is called upon to be the active means of developing socialism."2
This contemporary author is but paraphrasing Stalin, who declared
in what is sometimes called his "testament" of 1952 that although men
cannot negate or make new economic laws, the forces influencing
society can be turned to social reconstruction when they are understood.3
t Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
1. See HALL, COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 88 (1963).
2. See Farberov, On the New Socialist Constitution, 1961 Soy. Gos. i PRAVO No. 4,
47, 51.
3. See STALIN, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R. (1952), with
English translation in CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES 1 (Grulio ed. 1953). The documentary
record of the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress and the reorganization after
Stalin's death is treated therein.
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One of his legal experts, Professor Trainin, had earlier related this
approach specifically to law by indicating that although economic forces
provide the base for the superstructure that is law, law is not without
vitality of its own. Once the proletariat had seized power in a country,
"Law made secure, safe-guarded and regulated social relationships so as
to assure the development and influence of the moving force of policy."4
In short, when communists have seized the superstructure, i.e., the state
apparatus, they can manipulate it and its handmaiden the law to reform
the base itself.
Marx's own writing was never quite so clear, but it suggested as
much, for although he stated no such possibility in specific terms, the
implication was there. His formula for success in a. revolution was to
take property ownership from the bourgeoisie and to place it in the hands
of the proletariat. This would not only assure that workmen would them-
selves receive full value for their toil, but it would also prepare the way
for the complete reweaving of the social fabric into what he called
"communism.' '  The value component in Marxist-inspired society is not
in dispute; the debate emerges when the investigator turns to facts and
legal relationships. What has happened in the application of the Marxist
value system?
Communist and capitalist inspired societies seem poles apart when
contemporarily espoused values are compared. Sharp contrast is provided
between the community orientation of the former and the individualistic
orientation of the latter, but do the differences remain as pronounced
when the facts and the law are compared? Perhaps the conclusion of the
historian, Cyril E. Black, provides a key to understanding the contem-
porary scene. He finds that in all contemporary industrial societies,
regardless of their professed values, there has been a common guiding
force resting upon facts. For him "modern societies are produced by
the interaction of historically formed traditions with the more or less
universal imperatives of industrialism."6
In this reading Marxist-inspired leaders differ from those of the
West because of the tactics they use to overcome the restraining forces
of the particular traditions of the society which they lead. For them the
acceptability of any given balance depends upon their willingness to
sacrifice whatever may be the traditional concept of individual interests
in the society in which they function for what they believe necessary
to meet the inevitable pressures toward community which industrializa-
4. See Trainin, The Relationship Between State and Law, in SOvmT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 452 (Babb transl. 1951).
5. MARX & ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO pt. II, last two paras. (1948).
6. See BLACK, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 579 (1958).
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tion has created. This approach suggests that Marxists in Eastern
Europe and Asia are striking their balance for the same purpose as
leaders in the West, namely, salvaging as much benefit to the individual
as possible under the pressures they face. They are all seeking to lift
mankind above the crushing imperatives of industrialization. Differences
are to be found only in the way they do it.
Black's formula is pleasing because it suggests that all societies
may be compared when ranged upon a constantly shifting spectrum
rather than juxtaposed as unchanging opposites differing in quality, and
hence incomparable. He denies the validity of definition of varying
social structures in terms of polar opposites. Perhaps, under his theory,
the voluble proponents of conventional capitalism and orthodox Marxism
will be unable to deafen those who are seeking to determine whether
there is a general trend to be discerned in contemporary human behavior.
To establish a framework for a limited testing of Black's thesis,
some facts should first be examined. Professor Hall espouses this
procedure and would begin with the legal component, making certain
that nothing is omitted whether expressed in formal statutes or informal
social sanctions.' For the Marxist societies, property is taken as the key
element for examination because the Marxists say that it is the key.
The basic question is: What is the current treatment of property relations
in communist-led states, and in what direction are communist-led societies
likely to move with regard to property ?'
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW
Traditionally, an examination of a legal system and of its reasons
for existence begins with a state's constitution, if any there be. Here
appear the assumptions, both expressed and implied. Every constitution
of a communist-led state contains a chapter at or near the beginning
declaring the fundamentals of the social structure, among which primary
7. HALL, op. cit. supra note 1.
8. Before the Second World War comparison would have been limited to two
communist-led social systems, for there were no others. Only The Mongolian People's
Republic had appeared alongside the U.S.S.R., although there were remote regions of
China in the hands of communists conducting governments that were essentially inde-
pendent of Nanking. Today K-hrushchev says that the number of communist-led states is
fourteen. If a society may be called a "laboratory," the laboratories for the observation
of facts and legal relationships in states professing Marxist values have been multiplied.
The possibilities for generalization on a statistically sound basis have been increased.
What could have been previously only an exercise in tracing the influence of Marxist
thought as filtered through Russian minds primarily on societies sharing a Slavic
tradition or "culture" has become an exercise of much wider scope. The minds applying
Marxism are now of markedly differing education, and the societies under manipulation
are representative of quite different cultures, from the Latin American in the Western
hemisphere to the Chinese in the Eastern.
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place is given to the ownership of property. Even the Yugoslavs, who in
Chinese Communist eyes have slipped furthest from original Marxist
conceptions, incorporate in the "basic principles" the rule of "socialist
ownership of the means of production, which precludes the restoration
of any system of exploitation of one man by another."9 This puts all
communist-led societies within one framework as to basic principles
regarding productive property.
It is not too much to predict that this framework is unlikely to
change for any communist-led society, as it is fundamental to Marxist
thought. Stalin once emphasized, and this provides reason for certainty
that there will be no departure from this principle, that private ownership
of means of production could not be tolerated in a communist-led society
for two reasons, one doctrinal and the other practical. Doctrine requires
smashing of the bourgeoisie at their base in private ownership because
this provides the only means of preventing private individuals from
obtaining as interest on their capital the value contributed by workmen's
labor. Practice requires smashing of the bourgeoisie because by hy-
pothesis they will oppose effective national economic planning. This
latter view was best expressed in Stalin's noted interview with H. G.
Wells.
When Wells dared to suggest that President Roosevelt was on
the way to achieving a "planned, that is, a socialist, economy," Stalin
replied, "without getting rid of the capitalists, without abolishing the
principles of private property in the means of production, it is impossible
to create planned economy."" In light of this statement, and in recogni-
tion of the fact that all contemporary communists think planning is
essential to achievement of abundance and the perfect society, a com-
munist-led legal system failing to provide in some measure for con-
fiscation of private owners' productive property is unthinkable. That
is the first fact that has to be established in the comparison, as the
analysis moves from values to facts.
The intertvining of doctrine and tradition begins when this much
has been said. How much, if any, property is to remain in the hands
of private citizens in spite of the doctrine and the necessities of planning?
The analysis necessary for response to this question has to rest on the
method proposed by Professor Hall, who suggests that all comparison
9. CONSTITUTI N OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA introductory
pt., § 2.
10. Interview of H. G. Wells with Joseph V. Stalin on Marxism v. Liberalism,
July 23, 1934, printed as Joseph Stalin, H. G. Wells, Marxism vs. Liberalism, An inter-
view (July 23, 1934) (undated) p. 8.
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be related to a type or model.11 In the case of the communist-inspired
legal systems the model must unquestionably be that of the U.S.S.R.
Not only was it the first on the scene, but its proponents conceived it
to be a model for all that would come after. This is proved by Bolshevik
reaction to the shop stewards' movement in England after World War I.
Lenin and his colleagues expected a proletarian revolution in
England in 1920. The Independent Labor Party of England, which
acknowledged Marxist inspiration, sought answers to several questions
from the Communist International in Moscow prior to affiliation. Two
were: Is the Soviet system of government a fundamental principle of
the Third International, and if so, to what extent does the Third Inter-
national recognize the possibility of diverse forms of Soviet government
in different countries ?12
The reply stated that the formal way in which the proletariat will
achieve power is of no importance, but "what does count, however, is
the fact that the working class can neither protect nor maintain this
power unless the capitalist class is disarmed, and unless it is deprived
of its political rights until the time arrives when it can be included in
the ranks of the laboring people; unless the source of all the forces and
wealth of the country is concentrated in the hands of the working class,
whose power must be protected at all costs."'3 As to the form under
which the disarming of the capitalist class would occur, the authors of
the reply were less dogmatic.
"When the Communists in Russia put forward the slogan
of 'All power to the Soviets,' they as yet had no idea whether
this would be the form of proletarian dictatorship in other
countries. The revolutions in Germany, Hungary and Poland
prove that everywhere the workers strive to establish their
dictatorship on the principles of the Soviet system as most suit-
able to their interests. . . It is necessary to admit theoretically
the possibility of variations of forms depending upon the
varying economic structures of the different countries in a
state of revolution. It must, however, be said that the experi-
ence of the development of the world revolution until recently
has given no indications of the realization of this theory. It
is the opinion of the Communist International that it is not its
concern to indicate the exact form in which revolution is to
develop."' 4
This statement of faith in the Russian experience as creating a
11. See HALL, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 98-100.
12. THE I. L. P. AND THE 3RD INTERNATIONAL 37 (1920).
13. Id. at 43-44.
14. Ibid.
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model which had proven itself generally, and which contained as a
fundamental element the disarming of the bourgeoisie through confisca-
tion of their economic base in property, i.e., private ownership of
productive wealth, has remained to this day the position of the leadership
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. When the Communist
International redrafted its program in 1928,15 all countries of the world
were placed in categories, each of which was expected to evolve to the
next more productive type of economy, as the system of property owner-
ship was changed. The final breakthrough to the road to communism
would occur when capitalists were deprived of their ownership of pro-
ductive property. The record suggests that although there would be
variation in form and perhaps in degree in application of the principle,
the goal was the same for all, i.e., ownership of productive wealth by
the mass. How that mass was to be represented seemingly presented no
question. Perhaps the answer was assumed on the basis of Lenin's
practice. He had said that the state represented the mass, and it was
logical for the state, therefore, to take title. Not until Tito was this
axiom put in question by communists.
II. PROPERTY IN THE LAND
What has practice indicated as to the applicability of the model?
Will it be forced by communist leaders upon a society, regardless of its
traditions? The answer is "no," although the outsider can easily de-
termine that it is a reluctant no. Take the U.S.S.R.'s own experience.
Lenin compromised when he drafted his first property decree-that
concerning ownership of land." It annulled property ownership only in
large landed estates; it specifically exempted small landholdings of
peasants from confiscation. Lenin frankly admitted that he was com-
promising with tradition: "The land of the peasants and Cossacks of
average means shall not be confiscated. I hear voices raised here de-
claring that both the decree and the land mandate were drafted by the
Socialist-Revolutionaries. Well, suppose they were? What does it matter
who drafted them? As a democratic government we cannot ignore the
resolutions of the lower strata of the people, even though we may not
be in sympathy with them. In actual practice the peasants will find out
for themselves where the truth lies."'"
15. 1928 Program of the Communist International, in BLUEPRINT FOR WORLD
CONQUEST AS OUTLINED BY THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL (1946) (with an intro-
duction by William Henry Chamberlin).
16. Decree of Oct. 28, 1917 (o.s.) [1917] Sob. Uzak. R.S.F.S.R., item 3.
17. Address by V. I. Lenin, Nov. 8, 1918 (n.s.), 2 A. M. English translation in
BUNYAN & FISHER, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917-1918; DOCUMENTS AND MA-
TERIALS 128, 131-32 (1934).
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Applying this strategy of compromise Lenin introduced a decree
nationalizing all land, including that of small peasants, only when he
felt confident that his forces were superior to those of the Socialist
Revolutionaries. This decree was issued after the disbanding of the
Constituent Assembly in January 1918 and the assembly of the Third
Congress of Soviets with unquestioned Bolshevik leadership. The
decree of February 19, 1918,18 abolished for all time property rights in
land, sub-soil, waters, forests and livestock, transferring them without
direct or indirect indemnification "to the use of the whole toiling
population." Lenin's record demonstrated that within three months he
had thought it possible to abandon compromise with peasant aspirations
and to establish state ownership of Russia's primary resource, the land,
as the rock on which his legal system was to be built. Here was the
model against which he expected others to measure success. Compromise
was admissible under this formula, but it was to be recognized as such.
The Mongolian People's Republic, established in 1921, provided
the first proving ground of Lenin's formula in a culture of a different
type. 9 Its constitution, adopted shortly after Lenin's death in 1924,
declared land the property of the state, and this fundamental principle
has been retained ever since. In many respects Mongol patterns of life
were wholly different from those of the predominantly sedentary peasants
of Russia, but this did not dictate the desirability of variation. Perhaps
no one thought culture of any importance, for the Russians had already
established their model in Central Asia where the nomadic Kazakhs lived
a type of life quite like that of the Mongols. Or perhaps the real motive
lay in the feeling that culture could be ignored when the communists
were sufficiently strong to impose their model in spite of it. This had
been the case in Central Asia, which was an integral part of the Soviet
Union, and it was almost as strongly the case in Mongolia where Soviet
troops had helped establish the Mongolian Communists, and from whom
they were never far distant. Perhaps even more importantly, the nomadic
Mongol did not care who owned the land as long as he could use it for his
flocks and was not kept from it by some other individual's claim of
ownership.
The Soviet model was tested under more resistant conditions after
World War II. A measure of the severity of the test may be found
in the fact that of the communist governments emerging in Eastern
Europe and Asia, not one nationalized all of the land. Lenin's first
18. Decree of Feb. 19, 1918, [1918] Sob. Uzak. R.S.F.S.R., I, No. 25, item 346.
19. The legal history and texts of constitutions and principal decrees are published
in DENisov, KONSTITUTSIIA I OSNOVYE ZAKONEDATEL'NYE AKTY MONGOLSKoi NARODNOI
RESPUMLIKI (1952).
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land decree nationalizing only great estates and exempting the peasants
was the stopping point for all of them, although several continued
through various forms of social organization of agricultural production
to bring about in effect what they felt undesirable in law, namely,
communal use of the land. Rumania declared achievement of 100 per cent
collectivization of agriculture in 1959, and China through organization
of "communes" went far beyond the terms of the Land Law of 1950,
which had confiscated the land of landlords but preserved the system of
peasant land ownership, even providing for the return to each former
landlord of a small plot for his own use. In the Chinese case the
members of the village in theory pool their privately owned lands,
being permitted theoretically to retain small private gardens. In fact, by
this pooling they lose the value of private ownership which is the right
to alienate and to determine how the land shall be worked. It is now
said that a group of villages, called a "brigade," owns the land. Only in
Poland and Yugoslavia is the contrast in land ownership and use not
present. About 90 per cent of Polish farm lands remain privately owned
and used, most of these being very small.2"
Yugoslav law established the principles that "land belongs to those
who cultivate it" in their first land law of August 23, 1945, but land-
lords were deprived of any excess over 25 to 35 hectares if they were
individuals, and of all land if absentees or institutions. This principle
in variation currently appears in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1963 as a
guarantee of the right of ownership of arable land up to a maximum
area of ten hectares per household. Still, the Yugoslavs emphasize social
interest in land, for the constitution declares that "land is a resource of
common concern," and "shall be utilized in accordance with the general
conditions determined by law to assure the efficient utilization of land
and other general interests."'" The socialist feature in Yugoslav practice
is spelled out in two laws. The first, promulgated in 1957, requires every
land owner to cultivate his land in the manner of the district, and the
propriety of his use is supervised by the people's committee of the
district. Tillable land which is not worked for a year is to be taken
temporarily from the owner and transferred to an agricultural organiza-
tion or another individual for use, the socialist organizations having
priority in distribution. The temporary use is terminated under cir-
cumstances suggesting that the owner will resume use. The second law,
passed in 1959, establishes an obligation on the part of every user to use
20. Statistics on the size of private holdings are given in SZEMBERG, CHANGES IN
AGRARIAN STRucnTRE, 6 PoLIs PmzsrEcnvs No. 10, 6-12 (1963).
21. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA arts. 20-21.
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the land for agriculture and in accordance with an approved plan,
prepared with the help of a technical commission. Failure to comply
results in loss of use.
The Poles likewise link private ownership to their socialized econ-
omy, which is accomplished by four measures. Land owners are required
to deliver grain, potatoes and meat to the state in fixed quantities at
prices lower than the open market. The ratio of produce delivered on
a compulsory basis to total production is about 60 per cent. A second
link is through contracts between individuals and a socialist organization
under which the farmer is provided with the resources and advice
necessary to a technical type of production, in return for which he is
obligated to deliver all produce to the organization and to take money
premiums for his labor. A third link is the requirement that crops be
planted according to local planning, and the fourth is the revival of
agricultural cooperatives of a pre-war western type. In addition to their
old functions, the cooperatives are now being used as farm machinery
stations to raise the level of mechanization of peasant agriculture. The
individual feature in land law is reflected in a 1957 law which abolished
all previous restrictions on sales of agricultural land, although the pro-
spective buyer was required to submit a certificate of his proficiency
as a farmer. No farmer may own or lease, however, more than 50
hectares in Eastern Poland and 100 hectares in Western Poland.
The situation existing in China, Poland and Yugoslavia exemplifies
the necessity of going beyond the law relating to ownership of land to
examine the use if the hard fact is to be disclosed. The same can be said
of the situation in the U.S.S.R., for although the contrast is sharp
between the Soviet rule of no private ownership and the rule of all
other communist-led states except Mongolia of no prohibition of private
ownership, the edges of the contrast are blurred in the law relating to use.
Just as the communist-led states other than the U.S.S.R. and Mon-
golia have modified their apparent private enterprise policies to socialize
use, the U.S.S.R. law modifies the apparent state-enterprise policy to
individualize use. All land in the U.S.S.R. must be owned by the state,
but the occupiers are given "perpetual use." This means that for the
approximately 200,000 private households 2 who still function on private
plots outside of collective farms, there is provided a form of land tenure
that has features of ownership. Even for households who have entered
the collective farms, there are features of private control. Their houses
and household gardens are assigned to the household so long as it shall
22. See SSSR v TsiFAxIi v 1962 GODtY. KRATKII STATISTICHESKII SBORNII 22,
133 (1963).
740
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remain on the farm, and if it wishes to leave, other land must be provided.
Urban plots of land on which private dwellings are constructed are also
allocated in perpetuity, as are industrial sites for state enterprise. In
consequence, although all land in the U.S.S.R. is constitutionally declared
to be state property, much use is in the hands either of private individuals
or cooperative associations of peasants, both having use guaranteed in
perpetuity, defeasible only when the land is required for a specific state
purpose for which no other land can be found.23
The current system of permanent usage of land in the U.S.S.R. was
introduced by the Land Code of 1922 to enlist the incentives normally
associated with private ownership in encouraging development. By this
1922 innovation Lenin acknowledged that his land victory of February,
1918, had been too swift. At that time he had successfully overcome the
Socialist Revolutionaries; he had not, however, made sufficient com-
promise with peasant tradition. With the retreat to modified capitalism
introduced by the New Economic Policy in 1921, he decided to obtain the
benefits of incentive which private ownership provides without sacri-
ficing what seemed to him a sacred principle of Marxism; that productive
resources may not be privately owned.
Eastern European communists have not followed Lenin's example,
nor have the Asian communists. They have not taken Lenin's two steps
of nationalization and subsequent allocation of land on a permanent use
basis. Instead, they have preferred to continue with the pre-communist
form of ownership, although limiting the extent of the land that may
be privately owned and the manner of disposition and use. They have
presented a contrast with the Russian pattern in that their system permits
alienation, as the Soviet system does not. Yet they have placed them-
selves at a point somewhat short of that of modern capitalist states where
restraints on use by owners have multiplied extensively in recent years
beyond the common law of nuisance and waste to include zoning and
related statutes, but where an owner in fee simple still enjoys a consider-
able freedom to use and dispose of his property as he wishes, and is not
subjected to limitations on the size of his holding.
What has caused the differences in approach to ownership of land
in the communist-led states? Scholars in the Eastern European law
faculties suggest that in each of the legal systems of their group the
determining factor has been the strength of tradition. In all communist-
led states the ultimate goal is total state ownership. This has been possible
in the U.S.S.R. where ownership by private households was only begin-
23. Details relating to the law of land use may be found in HAZARD & SHAPIRO,
THE SovIr LEGAL Sys Em ch. 10 (1962).
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ning to appear under the Stolypin Laws introduced in 1906-1907 in an
attempt to create a middle-class.24 In the other Eastern European states
private ownership was of much longer duration so that the peasants had
fixed in their minds the position of a private owner. Poland and Yugo-
slavia provide the supreme examples, and precisely in those states, there
has been nationalization only of large estates and almost no collectiviza-
tion of use. Private households dominate the agricultural economy albeit
subject to socializing influences.
While such generalization of contrast is possible, enough reports
reach the Soviet law reviews to show that even in a highly socialized
polity the incentive to make profit causes permanent users to violate the
law. Thus, collective farm managements have leased plots of land to
private persons. A flagrant example of abuse was the leasing to an
individual of 11 hectares of marshy land by a collective farm management
in the Kazakh Republic for the purpose of growing onions. The rent was
517,000 old rubles. To disguise the transaction the individual was made
a member of the collective, and his group of employees was organized
as if it were a "vegetable brigade" of the farm. Ie kept the profits
which were computed as being 200,000 old rubles.2" In another report,
land was given by a farm to an individual who had performed work
for the farm, and he presumably thereafter used it as his own.2" Another
case discloses that land was made the subject of a contract concluded
by a farm with a shepherd who was not a member of the farm." For
tending the herd, composed of privately owned animals of collective
farm members, he was to receive in addition to grain, money and milk,
a parcel of land for a garden one-quarter hectare in size. The individual
failed to receive his parcel and had the effrontery to sue. More im-
portantly, the trial court gave judgment for him and did not even
discuss the illegality of the contract as a violation of the constitution
and the civil code. The mores of the locality were such that the court took
for granted the legality of such a deal.
Violations of land law by greedy individuals became so extensive
during 1963 that the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the R.S.F.S.R.
found it necessary to issue an order to struggle decisively with the
squatters upon land who had appropriated parcels to their own use
24. For the most thorough discussion of peasant history and of the Stolypin policy,
see ROBINSON, RURAL RUSSIA UNDER THE OLD REGIAE 193-94, 198-99 (1949).
25. See Lease Violation of Collective Farm Land, [1961] SoTs. ZAK. No. 2, at 83,
with English translation in HAZARD & SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note 23, at 28-29.
26. See Dobrovolskii, Contract Relationships of Collective Farms, [1961] SOTS.
ZAK. No. 3, at 39-40, with English translation in HAZARD & SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note
23, at 89.
27. Ibid.
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without obtaining legal allocations. 8 The struggle was to take the form
not only of return of the land to local authorities, but of criminal prose-
cutions under the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.29 Examples cited by
the Vice President of the court in an explanatory article indicated the
extremes to which individuals have dared to go.
One Nustrov in the city of Dzerzhinsk over the years 1959 to 1962
constructed a house on land which he had appropriated without formal
allocation. One Laverzhentsev in the city of Piatigorsk built a six-room
house and systematically rented its rooms, one of the lessees even being
the municipality's housing administration from which he had received
712 new rubles. Such cases mentioned are reported not to have been
unique, and they help explain the order of December 30, 1960, issued
by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. prohibiting the further
assignment to citizens of plots of land utilized for the private con-
struction of cottages, and the sale of cottages to citizens by state,
cooperative and other public organizations. If plots already allocated
were used for purposes other than those designated in the allocation,
the allocation was to be terminated, and prosecution initiated where
appropriate."0
The Polish Supreme Court has, however, moved in the direction
of compromise with tradition under the policy introduced after the
events of 1956. Prior to the refusal in 1956 to accept further direction
of Polish affairs by Soviet advisers, the supreme court issued a series
of decisions limiting use of privately owned property when owners
seemed to be functioning in a manner detrimental to what the court
determined to be the good of the workers. Thus, the Supreme Court of
the Polish People's Republic in 1952 completely forbade the remedy of
eviction of tenants for two months failure to pay rent or serious and
repeated infractions of apartment house regulations, as authorized by
inter-war statutes. In doing so the court said that "every member of
society has to support the goals outlined by the State. Since the State
exerts particular efforts to provide homes for everybody, nobody can
create a new need (for shelter) for the exclusive reasons that he has a
civil law claim for eviction."'" In another case a landlord of an apartment
28. See Laptev, On Court Practice in Cases of Squatting on the Land and Con-
struction of Individual Dwellings Without Permission, [1963] Soy. Iusr. No. 18, at 7-10.
29. R.S.F.S.R. CRIMNAL CODE art. 199, para. 1.
30. [1961] SoTs. ZAK. No. 3, at 83, with English translation in HAzaR & SHAPIxo,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 39.
31. These cases have been collected and abstracted by Dr. A. W. Rudzinski in an
unpublished manuscript prepared for the Research Program on Communist Affairs
of Columbia University. Other information on Polish law utilized in this paper has
been taken from his research notes.
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house in western Poland sued a worker who was his tenant for removal
of a pigeon coop from the backyard where it had been placed without
the landlord's consent. The defendant argued that he should not be
required to comply as this would deprive him of a favorite working
man's hobby. The trial court sent the case without decision to the
supreme court asking whether the building of the coop was admissible,
and whether the landlord in demanding its removal was violating article
3 of the general provisions of civil law of 1950 under which "rights
cannot be exercised in a manner violating the principles of social inter-
course in the People's State." The supreme court in its decision dealt
with the class character of the suit, but left the case undecided, returning
it to the trial court for further factual clarification. The end result
could not be ascertained from the published reports.
Even before the events of 1956 the court began to be more con-
ventional in its treatment of property ownership, and after 1956 it
consistently upheld the right of an owner to use his property without
greater restraint than had been required under the law as it was applied
before the establishment of the People's Republic of Poland. Thus, in
1955 a plenary resolution of the civil chamber of the supreme court
declared "People's legality means the duty of citizens to observe the laws
in force. While imposing this duty on the citizens it is not permitted to
obscure the actual meaning of the law and to expose citizens to unexpected
situations and surprises." Later in 1955 the court declared "a presump-
tion exists that the provisions of law are in conformity with the binding
principles of social intercourse."
After the resistance to Soviet guidance in October 1956, the supreme
court evidenced the new spirit of legality strongly. In a decision of
1961 it permitted the eviction of a cooperative by a landlord, even though
cooperatives are strongly favored in the communist-led states. It said
that "a demand for eviction cannot be considered an abuse of right for
the sole reason that a unit of the socialized economy (a cooperative)
has to be evicted, particularly when the actions of the latter constituting
the basis for eviction consist in violations of law."
III. PROPERTY IN INDUSTRY
Compromises such as the above worry the Chinese communists,
especially when they extend to the exploitation of industrial property.
Yugoslavia's pattern of decentralization of the economy to permit
workers in each plant to share in the selection and dismissal of plant
directors and to plan production with very few limitations set by the
central government has been anathema to the Chinese, even though the
WHITHER COMMUNIST-LED SOCIETY?
latter have permitted privately owned businesses to exist within limits
and have included within the categories of property permitted in China
"private property," which means in Marxist language privately owned
means of production.
The Chinese communists have presented a contrast between the ad-
vanced doctrinal position that "communes" are desirable both in agricul-
ture and industry to bring together the individual peasant households
and individual artisans within a framework of communal production
and the compromise made in preservation of capitalists. In the Chinese
view the Russian revolution moved too fast in expropriating many
privately owned industrial establishments in 1918, and all privately owned
industrial establishments having more than a set minimum number of
employees in 1920. Lenin's reversal of this policy in part with the intro-
duction of the New Economic Policy in 1921, with return of medium-
sized industrial establishments to private owners or sale to new entre-
preneurs, had come only after chaos on the industrial scene, and the
Chinese were determined to avoid moving too fast.
In view of this record of compromise with capitalists one may
wonder why the Chinese are violent in their criticisms of the Yugoslavs
as revisionists of Marxist doctrine, claiming that Yugoslavs are re-
established on a path that will lead to restoration of capitalism. The
conclusion suggested by the course of the two countries is that the Chinese
recognize the existence of privately owned industrial property only as a
concession of very limited duration. This is evidenced by the Chinese
transition to "communes" in agriculture and in the small-type industrial
sphere, while Yugoslav measures are interpreted as a permanent retreat
within the "socialized" sector, which is bound to lead to even further
corruption of the state-ownership system until capitalism has been
restored.
Even the Russians have recognized that state ownership of the
means of production does not preclude all possibility of slighting of
workmen's interests by state managers intent upon making a noted
production record regardless of cost in mechanical protections left un-
provided or worker's rights that are ignored. While refusing to, admit
that a situation resembling in any degree the emergence of an admini-
strative class in the factories with something of the same sentiments and
motivations as the managers in capitalist countries, the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. has sought to provide restraints on managers.
Aoreover, it has established trade union direction of what are called
"permanent production conferences" and has also ordered factory Com-
munist Party organizations to establish commissions which will exercise
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control over the managers.2 The Chinese have gone even further in
their restraints on managers, creating an administrative council which
shares decisions so that no one individual has the power that he is given
under the concept of edinonachalie or "one-man management," which
Lenin favored and Stalin put into practice."
Property incentive to production has been manifested most remark-
ably in the communist-led states in the wage system adopted by Stalin
in 1930. At that time he denounced the concept of egalitarianism which
Fabian and Marxist socialists alike had previously espoused. He intro-
duced wide variation in pay and supported it theoretically by reference
to Marx's slogan of what was appropriate to socialism as the stage
through which a society on the road to communism would have to pass,
namely, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his
work."
IV. INHERITANCE AND SOCIALISM'S PLATEAU
The reintroduction of property incentives to achieve maximum
production carried with it a new attitude toward the role of inheritance.
Prior to 1930 it had been tolerated as one of the concessions appropriate
to the New Economic Policy. Presumably, it would be abolished, to be
replaced by a system of social insurance developed to provide for widows
and orphans of the deceased bread winner of the family. Such had been
the approach of the first decree of 1918 which had abolished the Tsarist
inheritance law and substituted a system of administration of estates
by local soviets in the interest of incapacitated family members, if any
existed."' With the New Economic Policy, the civil code of 1922 carried
provisions for inheritance in limited amounts, any quantity above such
amounts escheating to the state, but inheritance was limited to a narrow
circle of heirs (the spouse of the deceased, his descendants, and relatives
or strangers incapable of working who had been dependent upon the
deceased for at least one year prior to the date of his death). It was
again permitted for property to pass by will, but only to beneficiaries
32. Statute on the Permanent Production Conference, July 9, 1958. SBoRNIK
ZAKONODATEL'NYYH AKTOV o TRUDE 42 (3rd ed. 1960), and Resolution of the CC of
the CPSU, June 26, 1959, with English translation in HAZARD & SHAPIRO, Op. Cit. supra
note 23, at 93, 95.
33. The Chinese law has been taken from an unpublished manuscript written in
1961 by Prof. H. F. Schurmann of the University of California (Berkeley) entitled
"Organizational Contrasts between Communist China and the Soviet Union." Other
information on the land law of the People's Republic of China utilized in this paper is
taken from the research notes of Dr. Lin Fu-shun of the East Asian Institute of
Columbia University.
34. Decree of April 27, 1918, [19181 Sob. Uzak. R.S.F.S.R. I, No. 34, item 456.
For the history of inheritance law in the U.S.S.R., see HAZARD & SHAPIRO, op. cit.
szpra note 23, at 53.
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chosen from among the statutory circle of heirs eligible to participate
as intestate takers. An accompanying law introduced an inheritance tax
progressing to a maximum rate of 50 per cent. When the New Economic
Policy was at its height, the maximum limit on estates that might pass by
inheritance was withdrawn because it was being evaded by those who
gave property to their children before death, and so in 1926 with an
extension of inheritance to estates of any amount, the only restraint lay
in the tax law, which increased its maximum bracket to a 90 per cent.
With the passing of the New Economic Policy and of capitalism,
and the change in emphasis to state enterprise, a new factor entered the
scene. It took the form of encouragement of savings to the benefit of
state investment. Thus, in 1928 the savings banks were authorized to
accept designations by owners of government securities of persons who
might place these securities in the bank's safekeeping even if those
persons were outside the circle of heirs to whom property.might be left
by will under the civil code. In 1935 this exemption was extended to
cash deposits to encourage savings, and the inheritance tax was abolished
in 1942 and replaced by a schedule of notarial fees graduated up to 10
per cent.
During the war the number of killed and missing became so large
that the government was faced with the problem of administration of
estates in large numbers, and the law was altered again to increase the
circle of heirs to include parents of the deceased who were incapable of
working and brothers and sisters, if none of the closer relatives was alive.
In the absence of any heirs, a testator might bequeath his estate to anyone.
In 1961 a new set of Fundamental Principles of Civil Law eliminated
all restriction on persons to whom property might be bequeathed.
Soviet text writers have argued that inheritance is no longer related
in any way to capitalism since the property of a decedent's estate cannot
be productive property." It has become an aspect of socialism as a de-
rivative of the right of socialist ownership. In so arguing they make
inheritance a natural concomitant of personal property. If personal
property is to be permitted at all, its inheritance has, apparently, to be
permitted also.
Justification of inheritance as an institution of personal property
gives it a permanency quite different from that of the one family farm,
which is clearly a compromise. So long as personal property exists, and
presumably that will be for as long as the state has not withered away
with the advent of complete communism, inheritance will remain. It is
35. See ANTIaMONOV & GA.vE, SOVTSxoE NASLEDSTVENNOE PRAvo 5-6 (1955),
with English translation in HAZARD & SHAPIRO, op. cit. supra note 23, at 53.
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not a compromise of temporary character; all fourteen communist-led
states have retained the institution.
Can it be said that with justification of inheritance as an institution
of permanency the Marxist inspired revolution has reached its permanent
plateau? Can one expect a subsequent movement to the left leading to
its abolition when social insurance funds reach adequate proportions
throughout the communist-led states to meet the needs of widows and
orphans? The communists of 1918 would have responded in the af firma-
tive to the second question and would have resisted vigorously the impli-
cations of an affirmative answer to the first. It seems unlikely today
that any communists would take the view of the policy makers of 1918.
Even the Chinese retain inheritance, although they declare their opposi-
tion to what they call the embourgeoisation of society in the U.S.S.R.
They fear that Soviet leaders will follow Yugoslavia back to capitalism,
but they do not place inheritance on the list of institutions to be overcome
in the foreseeable future
Soviet policy makers have become keenly aware of the extent to
which personal property concessions tend to corrupt the group with sub-
stantial income. They prefer to declare this corruption a heritage of
capitalism in the minds of men rather than to accept it as an inevitable
consequence of their decision to utilize property incentives as a spur to
production. They have published decrees36 in 1961 and 1962 authorizing
courts to deprive owners of private homes, or of other consumers' goods
such as automobiles, if their purchase was not from income derived from
toil. Homes and automobiles have been confiscated at such a pace under
these decrees that courts have begun to criticize excessive zeal in law
enforcement agencies, and the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. found
it necessary in October, 1963, to chastize careless investigators of sources
of income. At the same time campaigns against embezzlers and thieves
of state property are intensified to dry up the sources of unearned
income."
V. EFFORTS TO REGAIN SOCIALIST MOMENTUM
The Chinese communists have not been content with Soviet measures
which seem to them to evidence the degeneration of Soviet society and
36. Decree of Sept. 28, 1963, [1963] Ved. Verkh. Soy. R.S.F.S.R., No. 39, item
699, and Decree of July 26, 1962, [1963] Ved. Verkh. Soy. R.S.F.S.R., No. 30, item 464.
For an account of excessive zeal in application of these decrees, see The Prosecutor
Defeinds, in XV CURRENT DIGEST OF SOVIET PREss No. 29 at 31 (1963). For an
account of the action of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., see Plenum Verkhovnogo
Suda SSSR, Izvestiia, No. 259 (14422), Oct. 31, 1963, p. 3.
37. For a review of these measures, see Feldbrugge, Soviet Criminal Lawt-the
Last Six Years, 54 J. Clim. L. 249 (1963).
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which fail to reach the trouble at the source. Their contribution to
efforts to regain socialist momentum has been the commune, both agricul-
tural and industrial. They have been embarrassed by Soviet criticism
of these communes as premature, and even more by proof of prematurity
in failure of communes in many regions. Yet, they have not abandoned
the idea. The return to the form of cooperative farm in some cases has
been only a retreat, and the communes have been preserved generally
where introduced into industrial communities.
Chinese fear of a Soviet retreat to private enterprise is so substantial
that the road to communism can hardly be regained; this may soon be
supported by yet another event. Reports reached the outside world from
Poland at the end of 1963 that a committee from the U.S.S.R. was study-
ing the Polish practice of private household farming.38 The report states
that the committee is seeking an alternative to collectivized farming in the
marginal areas of the U.S.S.R. If this report proves to be true, it will
look as if the Soviet model of 100 per cent collectivization, which other
communist-led states have sought to emulate, was being abandoned.
Though this change might seem to be slight in view of the fact that both
Poland and Yugoslavia have already retreated from their earlier cam-
paigns to collectivize, the position of the U.S.S.R. is different. It is one
thing to postpone and perhaps abandon a goal in a communist-led state
of little stability and short experience; it is quite another to do so in a
state of nearly fifty years duration and unquestioned stability.
Soviet leaders see the danger themselves in worship of property
incentives as a means to achievement of abundance and ultimate com-
munism. The Communist Party Program of 1961 restated for com-
munists the goal of the 1919 program which called for a society in which
money would eventually disappear. More than lip service is being paid
to this goal in the U.S.S.R., for measures are being introduced in that
direction. These measures are much less extreme than those of the
period of war communism in Soviet Russia, when postal and telegraph
services were free and housing was provided without rent. They are
limited to efforts to persuade citizens to work without pay in govern-
ment offices, especially in the distribution of housing space. Since the
work-without-pay measure is on a rotating basis, many people are being
brought into the scheme, which began in Sverdlovsk and has now spread
to all cities. In addition, individuals provide unpaid police service in the
driwizini, and they serve on the comradely courts which were given
increased power in 1963 to supplement the work of the regular courts.
38. Radio Liberty (New York) Press Release No. 122063 (Dec. 1963).
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Although these forms of unpaid public service are being introduced
with the avowed purpose of moving the population in the direction of
a "moneyless" communism, it would be startling if anyone suggested
that industrial or agricultural production should occur without pay in the
U.S.S.R. or in the People's Democracies to the West. Everyone is being
required to work in accordance with the constitutional duty to work.
Exhortation of the public to respect this duty as necessary to the guar-
antee of the right to work is frequent in the Soviet press, but it is not
suggested that work in production be without pay.
VI. CONCLUSION
Soviet society's leaders have made their compromise and established
their balance. Property incentives are still a major feature of their plan
for production in both industry and agriculture. In the U.S.S.R., doctrine
still plays its part in requiring that the land and industrial property be
state owned, although the lines are blurred by the concept of perpetual
use. But once the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. are crossed into the People's
Democracies, compromise has been made even with this doctrine. While
Rumania and Czechoslovakia claim to have achieved full collectivization,
both still permit private land ownership. Poland and Yugoslavia allow
both private land ownership and a high percentage of private cultivation,
since the peasants seem unwilling to work at maximum capacity under
any other scheme.
Industry has been curtailed in all communist-led states as a private
activity, although the Chinese have made more of a show of keeping
their private producers than have the other People's Democracies, albeit
with many restraints on labor practices and on the realization of profits.
They alone, although with a later start than the other communist-led
states, seem confident that the proletarian revolution has not halted. They
alone persevere in a vigorous plan to move on to full communism at a
fast pace asserting that their comrades in the other communist-led
countries are in danger of slipping back to capitalism, if they have not
done so already as has revisionist Yugoslavia.
For the outsider seeking to assess the trend, the forseeable future
lies with continuing compromise. It will be compromise with both
peasants and industrial workmen. The latter will be paid on the basis
of work done rather than need. Peasants will be stimulated to work
harder on the soil by a variety of incentives, perhaps including even
decollectivization of marginal farms within the U.S.S.R. itself. If this
latter event occurs, the U.S.S.R. will be brought nearer to Poland and
Yugoslavia in property relationships, and will have been moved from its
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position of polar extremity in the communist-led group of states.
With such a prognosis, it is unlikely that the fears of the Chinese
are to be realized. Resale of public industry to capitalists, as occurred
under the New Economic Policy in the U.S.S.R., is out of the question.
The scales will not be tilted so far, although there may possibly be an
adoption of a system of management that allows the trade union to
participate more in the formulation of operating decisions than is presently
the case in the U.S.S.R. with its system of one-man management. This
would not be capitalism, but it could narrow the gap between the East
and the West, if such systems as that of West Germany's representation
of trade unions upon boards of directors be compared, and if one
considers that even in the United States pension funds of unions are
invested increasingly in common stocks of corporations in whose plants
the unions function. The line between management, owners and unions
is being increasingly blurred if not obliterated.
In sum, the communist-led societies are far indeed from achievement
of the goals set by the Communist Party Program of 1919 for Soviet
Russia in implementation of the Marxist value system. Some of the
goals that are still acknowledged have been postponed to a time so remote
as to look utopian, although the value system has not been renounced.
Perhaps current leaders of the U.S.S.R. and of the People's Democracies
still anticipate achievement, but communist leaders of new generations
of Russians, Poles, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs and Chinese may be content
with things as they are. They have met the first requirement of national-
ization of major productive resources, and that achievement may seem
to be enough to assure no exploitation of man in the interest of capitalist
owners and sufficient economic planning to avoid what is believed to
be the waste of capitalism.
This does not mean that experimentation with social forms and the
revision of law designed to bring them into being has ended. Textbook
authors describing the communist-led system of government and law
will have a difficult time keeping their accounts up to date. Yet, what-
ever experimentation occurs the social outlines of society have probably
been firmly established. The principal facts and legal relationships
developed in implementation of values will probably remain recognizable
for the rest of the century, and even longer. Variations there will surely
be, for the Soviet communists seem really to have accepted the concept
of "many roads to socialism." These will probably run from the "leftist"
forms of China, to the "rightist" forms of Yugoslavia, with the U.S.S.R.,
Poland and Hungary in between. On this scale the U.S.S.R. will remain
the median, the prototype, as it has been for over 40 years.
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